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We	 investigated	 an	 outbreak	 of	 Middle	 East	 respiratory	
syndrome	(MERS)	at	King	Fahad	Medical	City	(KFMC),	Ri-
yadh,	Saudi	Arabia,	during	March	29–May	21,	2014.	This	
outbreak	involved	45	patients:	8	infected	outside	KFMC,	13	
long-term	patients	at	KFMC,	23	health	care	workers,	and	1	
who	had	an	indeterminate	source	of	infection.	Sequences	of	
full-length	MERS	coronavirus	(MERS-CoV)	from	10	patients	
and	a	partial	sequence	of	MERS-CoV	from	another	patient,	
when	compared	with	other	MERS-CoV	sequences,	demon-
strated	that	this	outbreak	was	part	of	a	larger	outbreak	that	
affected	multiple	 health	 care	 facilities	 in	Riyadh	 and	 pos-
sibly	arose	from	a	single	zoonotic	 transmission	event	 that	
occurred	in	December	2013	(95%	highest	posterior	density	
interval	November	8,	2013–February	10,	2014).	This	finding	
suggested	continued	health	care–associated	 transmission	
for	5	months.	Molecular	epidemiology	documented	multiple	
external	 introductions	 in	a	seemingly	contiguous	outbreak	
and	helped	 support	 or	 refute	 transmission	 pathways	 sus-
pected	through	epidemiologic	investigation.
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavi-rus (MERS-CoV) was first recognized as a cause of 
severe human respiratory disease in 2012 (1). As of June 
19, 2015, a total of 1,338 confirmed cases of MERS and at 
least 475 MERS-associated deaths had been reported (2). 
Human zoonotic infections have largely been acquired in 
the Middle East. Imported cases in Europe, North America, 
Africa, and Asia have been linked to travel to the Middle 
East, occasionally with local secondary transmission (2).
Although human infections are zoonotic in origin, clus-
ters of human-to-human transmission have been reported, 
particularly within households or health care settings (3–6). 
In an outbreak in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 2014 involving 
multiple health care facilities, 255 laboratory-confirmed 
MERS cases were documented during a 2-month period, 
but intensified infection prevention measures in hospitals 
terminated that outbreak (6,7). Available genetic data for 
these patients showed that they were clustered, which sug-
gested widespread transmission of related viruses (6). Of 
191 symptomatic patients, 40 were health care workers 
(HCWs). For the remaining patients for whom data were 
available, most had some form of contact with a health care 
facility or patients with suspected MERS. Investigation of 
outbreaks in health care settings also identified asymptom-
atic and milder cases, especially in healthy young adults 
and HCWs with no underlying illnesses (7). Dromedary 
camels have been proposed as a source of human infection; 
however, the possibility of other reservoirs and intermedi-
ate hosts has not been excluded (2,8).
Molecular epidemiologic analysis of transmission was 
attempted for a 2013 MERS outbreak at multiple health 
care facilities in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia (5). 
Combined analysis of genomic and epidemiologic data 
provided insights into transmission chains that would oth-
erwise not have been apparent. The study on the 2014 Jed-
dah outbreak included analysis of viral sequences from 2 
hospitals in Riyadh and identified a cluster of infections 
at the Prince Sultan Military Medical City (PSMMC) dur-
ing March–April 2014 (6). In this study, we analyzed viral 
genetic data for patients and HCWs with MERS at King 
Fahad Medical City (KFMC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, dur-
ing February 1–May 31, 2014, and available epidemiologic 
data to better understand transmission within the hospital 
and place the outbreak in KFMC in the context of contem-
poraneous MERS outbreaks in other hospitals in Riyadh.
Materials and Methods
Clinical Setting
KFMC is a 1,200-bed tertiary care hospital in Riyadh that 
comprises 4 hospitals and 4 medical centers on 1 campus. 
The main hospital is affiliated with specialized women’s, 
children’s, and rehabilitation hospitals. The 4 centers are 
the National Neuroscience, Heart, Oncology, and Diabetes 
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centers. The main hospital, affiliated hospitals, and centers 
provide nationwide referral services. This study was ap-
proved by the Institutional Review Board of KFMC. 
The emergency department (ED) is located on the 
ground floor of KFMC. It accepts patients from throughout 
Saudi Arabia; in 2014, there were 139,173 recorded visits. 
Time in the ED is usually brief, but some patients might 
have extended ED stays depending on availability of isola-
tion rooms in the wards.
Medical wards (MWs) MW-C and MW-D, which 
have 50 beds combined (online Technical Appendix 1 Fig-
ure 1, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/11/15-0944-
Techapp1.pdf), are located in the main hospital and admit 
patients from the ED, outpatient clinics, and referrals from 
elsewhere in Saudi Arabia. Most rooms in these 2 adjacent 
wards have 4 beds. However, MW-C has 6 isolation rooms, 
2 with negative pressure ventilation, and MW-D has 4 
isolation rooms, none with negative pressure ventilation. 
Patients are occasionally moved between the 2 wards, but 
nurses work only in their assigned wards.
Patients and Specimens
Patients, including HCWs, confirmed to have MERS diag-
nosed at KFMC during February 1–May 31, 2014, com-
posed the study population. Nasopharyngeal swab speci-
mens and tracheal aspirates or bronchoalveolar lavages 
were collected for viral diagnosis. A case of MERS, ac-
cording to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health definition, 
was fever and acute respiratory illness in a patient who had 
a positive test result for MERS-CoV infection. Criteria for 
investigation of patients and HCW for MERS-CoV is pro-
vided in online Technical Appendix 1.
Laboratory Diagnosis
A reverse transcription PCR diagnostic kit (MERS-Coro-
navirus EMC Orf1a and SA1 EMC upstream E-gene, Light 
Mix Modular Assays; TIB MOLBIOL, Adelphia, NJ, 
USA, and Roche, Mannheim, Germany) was used for the 
screening and confirmation of MERS-CoV infection. Each 
sample was also tested simultaneously for 15 respiratory 
viruses (influenza A and B; parainfluenza viruses 1, 2, 3, 
and 4; respiratory syncytial virus; adenovirus; enterovi-
rus; human metapneumovirus; human coronaviruses 229E, 
OC43, NL63 and HKU-1; and human bocavirus) by using 
the Seeplex RV15 ACE Detection Kit (Seegene Inc., Seoul, 
South Korea). Samples from the early phase of the out-
break were tested for MERS-CoV at the Ministry of Health 
laboratories; midway into the outbreak, KFMC developed 
in-house MERS-CoV testing capability.
Epidemiologic Data
Patient demographics and epidemiologic data on study 
participants were collected by retrospective chart review, 
from electronic health records, and from leave or sick leave 
records of staff. Patients with confirmed cases of MERS 
were spatiotemporally mapped within the hospital. Addi-
tional contact histories were obtained through direct inter-
views with the infected HCWs or patients. On the basis of 
date of hospital attendance or admission, date of onset of 
illness, and reported incubation period for MERS (median 
5 days, range 2–14 days) (9), the patients were classified 
into those acquiring infection outside KFMC (externally 
acquired), long-term patients acquiring infection while at 
KFMC (long-term patients) and HCWs working at the hos-
pital. HCWs were presumed to have acquired nosocomial 
infections at KFMC, although infection outside the hospital 
could not be excluded.
Potential transmission links were identified on the ba-
sis of patients or HCW present or working in the same ward 
or ED concurrently with a MERS patient. Given the retro-
spective nature of this study, it was not possible to assess 
whether HCW exposures occurred without use of adequate 
personal protective equipment (PPE).
Genetic Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis
cDNA was synthesized by using gene-specific primers for 
different regions of the MERS-CoV genome and subse-
quently subjected to multiple sets of PCR that covered the 
entire virus genome (primers available on request). Over-
lapping PCR products generated were sequenced by using 
MERS-CoV–specific primers. Sequences (without primer 
sequences) were aligned and assembled by using Geneious 
version 8.0.5 (http://www.geneious.com). Genomes were 
sequenced with >3–5 times coverage.
A time-resolved phylogenetic tree was estimated 
from a concatenated gene alignment of MERS-CoV ge-
nome by using BEAST version 1.8 (http://beast.bio.ed.ac.
uk/). Analysis was conducted by using a general time- 
reversible model and gamma-distributed sites with sepa-
rate rates for the 3 codon positions under a relaxed lognor-
mal clock model.
Results
Descriptive Epidemiology
The number of specimen tested for MERS-CoV in March, 
April, and May 2014, were 3, 222 and 1,731, respectively, 
increasingly markedly during the course of the outbreak. 
During the study period, 45 patients at KFMC had viro-
logically confirmed MERS. Eight of these patients had 
externally acquired infections, and 13 long-term hospi-
talized patients had nosocomial infections; 23 HCWs 
had MERS-CoV infections, presumably acquired at 
KFMC. Patient EA-9 (disease onset May 5, first ED visit 
May 1) might have been infected either at KFMC or at an 
external source.
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Enhanced surveillance identified 4 asymptomatically 
infected HCWs. Disease onset dates of different patient 
groups are shown in Figure 1. Thirteen patients died of 
their infections: 3 of 8 patients with externally acquired 
infections, 9 of 14 long-term hospitalized patients, and 1 
of 23 HCWs. MERS-CoV–infected HCWs had a median 
age of 35.5 years (range 24–58 years); non-HCWs had a 
median age of 60 years (range 12–77 years) (p<0.005). De-
mographic characteristics of all patients and work locations 
of infected HCWs are shown in online Technical Appendix 
1 Table 1.
Viral Genetic Analysis
To investigate virus introduction and intrahospital transmis-
sion pathways, available archived respiratory specimens 
from 15 patients who had high viral loads were obtained 
and genetically analyzed. Whole-genome sequences were 
obtained from 10 patients and a partial genome was ob-
tained from 1 patient (Table; online Technical Appendix 1 
Table 2) (GenBank accession nos.  KT121572–KT121581 
and KT202801).
A time-resolved phylogenetic tree (Figure 2) shows 
whole-genome sequences from these 10 patients within 
the context of other available MERS-CoV whole-genome 
sequences. Nodes A, B, and C have strong statistical sup-
port in this time-resolved phylogeny and in a separate 
maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of these same se-
quences (aBayes branch support) (10). Phylogenetic analy-
sis suggests that patients at KFMC were part of a larger 
outbreak of MERS that was ongoing in Riyadh at that time, 
involving, but perhaps not limited to, other hospitals, such 
as PSMMC and King Khalid University Hospital (KKUH). 
The dated phylogeny suggests that a putative zoonotic 
event (node A in Figure 2) occurred on approximately De-
cember 31, 2013 (95% highest posterior density (HPD) in-
terval November 8, 2013–February 10, 2014), although the 
possibility of separate zoonotic events for closely related 
viruses cannot be excluded.
Virus isolate KFMC-9 clusters phylogenetically with 
viruses from KKUH and separately with other viruses from 
KFMC. This isolate has a signature mutation (C26144T 
KFMC-9) that is also present in KKUH-90b, KKUH-291, 
and KKUH-368 isolates, indicating that patient from which 
this virus was isolated was infected with a virus related 
to those in the ongoing outbreak at KKUH (Figure 3; on-
line Technical Appendix 2, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/21/11/15-0944-Techapp2.xlsx). The ancestral node 
B has strong statistical support (posterior density >0.95) 
and an estimated date of January 28, 2014 (95% HPD inter-
val December 16, 2013–February 27, 2014), which is long 
before the date of onset of the first known case of MERS 
at KFMC (March 29, 2014) (Table). Node C in the dated 
phylogeny (Figure 2) also has strong statistical support, and 
an estimated date for this node was February 15 (HPD in-
terval January 10–March 16) which is also before the date 
of disease onset of the first known patient in the outbreak at 
KFMC. Thus, it is likely that there were multiple introduc-
tions of MERS-CoV to KFMC to account for the observed 
virus genetic diversity in the patients studied at KFMC.
Viruses in node A in the phylogenetic tree have a nu-
cleotide substitution rate of 6.54 × 10−4 nt substitutions/site/
year (genome length analyzed 29,897 kb), which is com-
parable to a previously reported value of 6.3 × 10–4 (5). 
Estimated ancestral sequence at nodes C and E (identical) 
Figure 1.	Date	of	symptom	onset	for	patients	with	confirmed	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus	(MERS-CoV)	infection	
hospitalized	at	King	Fahad	Medical	City,	Riyadh,	Saudi	Arabia,	2014.	For	4	asymptomatic	health	care	workers	(HCWs)	detected	by	
screening,	date	of	virus	detection,	rather	than	symptom	onset,	is	indicated.	
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in the dated phylogenetic tree and nucleotide substitutions 
observed in virus sequences obtained in this study, together 
with virus sequences from patients in KKUH and PSMMC 
hospitals that appear to be related to this outbreak, are 
shown in Figure 3 and online Technical Appendix 2.
We tested the hypothesis that KFMC-7, KFMC-8, and 
KFMC-10 viruses diverged from the ancestral virus after 
April 5, 2014, the date that patient EA-1 came to the ER. 
Observed nucleotide differences were greater than would 
be expected if KFMC-7, KFMC-8, and KFMC-10 di-
verged at KFMC after April 5, suggesting that >1 of these 
3 viruses were transmitted separately to KFMC (online 
Technical Appendix 1 Table 3). Conversely, KFMC-1–6 
viruses had expected mutation rates, in accordance with 
observed phylogeny. Node E (including viruses KFMC-
1–6) was less robust, but had an estimated date of April 4 
(HPD interval March 9–April 25), which as an entry point 
for transmission at KFMC is more plausible with observed 
epidemiologic data. Viruses KFMC 1–6 had <1 nt differ-
ence between them for 29,897 nt sequenced, and the zoo-
notic time span between the oldest and newest virus spec-
imens was 20 days (online Technical Appendix 2). The 
partial genome sequence for KFMC-11 is also identical 
with that of KFMC-1–6 or KFMC-7. However, this par-
tial sequence, although 5,225 nt, cannot optimally resolve 
transmission pathways.
Epidemiologic Data
Ward locations and patient data are shown in online Tech-
nical Appendix 1 Figure 2, and layout of key wards is 
shown in online Technical Appendix 1 Figure 1. Before 
admission to KFMC, patient EA-1, the first patient to be 
identified during the outbreak at KFMC, had regularly vis-
ited his father, who was hospitalized at PSMMC, where a 
MERS outbreak was ongoing.
On the basis of known incubation periods, onset of ill-
ness, and presence at the same location (online Technical 
Appendix 1 Figure 2), the ER was a plausible venue for 
MERS-CoV transmission from patient EA-1 to KFMC-0 
and from patient KFMC-0 to patient KFMC-1. Patients 
KFMC-0 and KFMC-1 were co-workers in the ER, and pa-
tient KFMC-1 provided care for patient KFMC-0 when she 
was ill in the ER. Patient KFMC-1 also provided care for 
patient KFMC-0 without PPE in the staff quarters when she 
was on sick leave (April 15). There were no archived speci-
mens from patients EA-1 and KFMC-0. Patient KFMC-1 
was the first patient from this outbreak from whom we have 
virus genomic data.
Patient KFMC-0 was subsequently treated in MW-C 
where long-term patients KFMC-2 (illness onset April 
25), KFMC-4 (illness onset May 1), and KFMC-6 (illness 
onset May 6) became ill during April 4–May 3 and were 
hospitalized, and viruses closely related to the virus from 
the KFMC-1 cluster (online Technical Appendix 1 Fig-
ure 2) were isolated. Patient KFMC-3 was a chronically 
ill long-term patient in MW-C. A respiratory infection 
developed, and infection with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus was detected in respiratory specimens on April 27. 
She was discharged on April 4 but was readmitted on May 
6 because of deteriorating respiratory function and was 
 
 
 
Table. Characteristics	of	21	patients	tested	for	infection	with	MERS-CoV,	King	Fahad	Medical	City,	Saudi	Arabia,	2014* 
Patient Age,	y/sex 
Date	of	illness	
onset 
Date of first 
ED	visit 
Date of 
hospitalization Patient	group Outcome 
Externally	acquired	infections       
 EA-1 32/M Mar	29 Apr	5 Apr	6 Patient Recovered 
 EA-2 65/F Apr	6 Apr	11 Apr	12 Patient Deceased 
 EA-3 46/F Apr	13 Apr	20 Apr	21 Patient Recovered 
 EA-4 70/M Apr	18 Apr	22 Apr	28 Patient Deceased 
 EA-5 64/M Apr	18 Apr	27 Apr	28 Patient Recovered 
 EA-6 22/F Apr	20 Apr	27 Apr	28 Patient Recovered 
 EA-7 28/F May	1 May	2 Transferred Patient Transferred 
 EA-8 21/F May	5 May	8 May	9 Patient Deceased 
 EA-9† 50/F May	5 May	1 May	3 Patient Deceased 
Nosocomial	infections       
 KFMC-0 34/F Apr	9 Apr	16 Apr	17 ED nurse Recovered 
 KFMC-1 45/F Apr	20 Apr	29 May	2 ED nurse Deceased 
 KFMC-2 60/F Apr	25 Apr	4 Apr	5 Patient Deceased 
 KFMC-3 62/F Apr	27 Feb	1 Jan	12 Patient Deceased 
 KFMC-4 63/F May	1 Apr	21 Apr	22 Patient Deceased 
 KFMC-5 56/F May	3 May	10 May	12 Nurse,	MW-D Recovered 
 KFMC-6 74/F May	6 Mar	19 Mar	21 Patient Transferred 
 KFMC-7 36/F Apr	26 Apr	30 May	3 Nurse,	MW-C Recovered 
 KFMC-8 53/F Apr	30 Mar	27 Mar	28 Patient Recovered 
 KFMC-9 29/M May	1 May	7 May	9 ED nurse Recovered 
 KFMC-10 46/F Apr	23 Apr	30 May	5 Nurse,	MW-C Recovered 
 KFMC-11 41/F Apr	24 Apr	27 Apr	30 Nurse,	MW-C Recovered 
*MERS-CoV,	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus;	ED,	emergency	department;	KFMC,	King	Fahad	Medical	City;	MW,	medical	ward. 
†This	patient	visited	the	ED	on	May	1	for	another	illness	and	was	hospitalized	on	May	3.	MERS-related	symptoms	developed	on	May	5	while	she	was	
hospitalized.	The	incubation	period	was	compatible	with	either	externally	acquired	or	nosocomial	infection. 
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subsequently given a diagnosis of MERS-CoV infection. 
Retesting of a predischarge respiratory specimen collected 
on April 30 showed MERS-CoV infection. Thus, patient 
KFMC-3 probably had MERS a few days before the test-
ing date. However, the exact onset of illness could not be 
determined. Patient KFMC-3 used the intensive care unit 
bed previously used by patient EA-1 on April 15.
Nurse KFMC-5, who worked in MW-D, had disease 
onset on May 3. Virus isolated from her specimen was 
closely related to the cluster of viruses isolated in MW-C. 
Although this nurse had no duties in MW-C, MW-C and 
MW-D are adjacent general medical wards on the same 
hospital floor (online Technical Appendix 1 Figure 1).
Genetic analysis suggested that viruses from patient 
KFMC-9, KFMC-7, KFMC-8, and KFMC-10 were intro-
duced separately into KFMC. Patient KFMC-9 worked in 
the ER and patients EA-6 and EA-3, who acquired MERS 
outside the hospital, were admitted to the ER 4 and 11 days, 
respectively, before onset of disease in patient KFMC-9, 
which indicated that patients EA-6 and EA-3 were pos-
sible sources of infection for patient KFMC-9. Patient 
EA-2 was hospitalized in a 4-bed room in MW-C where 
nurses KFMC-7 and KFMC-10 worked. In addition, pa-
tient KFMC-8 was a long-term patient in the same ward, 
which provided opportunities for introduction of a geneti-
cally distinct virus (online Technical Appendix 1 Figure 2).
Discussion
We describe a hospital-associated outbreak of >45 MERS-
CoV infections that occurred at KFMC, Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, during March–May 2014. There appears to be a 
periodicity in peaks of transmission ≈7 days apart, which is 
Figure 2.	Time-resolved	phylogenetic	tree	of	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus	(MERS-CoV)	genomes,	Saudi	Arabia,	2014,	
constructed	by	using	BEAST	version	1.8	(http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk/).	Upper	scale	bar	indicates	nucleotide	substitutions	per	site.	Lower	
scale	bar	indicates	years	in	reference	to	sample	KFMC-6	(collected	May	18,	2014).	Genomes	sequenced	in	this	study	are	indicated	
in	bold.	*Indicates	major	nodes	with	posterior	probabilities	>0.95.	Estimated	median	dates	for	nodes	A,	B,	C,	D,	and	E	(95%	highest	
posterior	density	intervals)	are	A)	Dec	31,	2013	(Nov	8,	2013–Feb	10,	2014),	B)	Jan	28,	2014	(Dec	16,	2013–Feb	27,	2014),	C)	Feb	15,	
2014	(Jan	10,	2014–Mar	16,	2014),	D)	Feb	26,2014	(Jan	23,	2014–Mar	25,	2014),	E)	Apr	4,	2014	(Mar	9,	2014–Apr	25,	2014).	KKUH,	
King	Khalid	University	Hospital;	KFMC,	King	Fahd	Medical	City.
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compatible with the known incubation period and case-to-
case serial interval reported to be 7.6 days (4).
Before this molecular epidemiologic study, the as-
sumption was that the outbreak at KFMC was self-con-
tained and originated from patient EA-1, independent of 
other outbreaks reported in Riyadh. Viral genomic data 
obtained during this study generated alternative hypotheses 
and show that the outbreak of KFMC was linked to ongoing 
transmission within health care facilities in Riyadh at that 
time, including, but probably not limited to, PSMMC and 
KKUH. Data suggest a single zoonotic event that occurred 
around December 31, 2013 (95% HPD interval November 
8, 2013–February 10, 2014), followed by transmission in 
health care facilities for ≈5 months. However, an alterna-
tive possibility of multiple, independent spillover events 
from closely related viruses in a zoonotic reservoir cannot 
be excluded. This chain of transmission was spread as far 
as Indiana in the United States by an HCW from Riyadh 
(11) and 2 travelers returning to the Netherlands (12). Viral 
sequence data for viruses from the 2 travelers was fragmen-
tary and excluded from phylogenetic analysis. However, 
this cluster of human MERS-CoV in Riyadh was distinct 
from the large contemporaneous cluster of human-to-hu-
man transmission that occurred in Jeddah and represents a 
separate zoonotic transmission event (6). Only 1 of the ana-
lyzed sequences from the  Riyadh cluster has an amino acid 
change in the receptor binding domain of the spike protein 
(13), the C23,697T nonsynonymous mutation in KFMC-8, 
which leads to an R®C amino acid change.
In this outbreak, 36 cases of MERS-CoV infection 
were putatively acquired through nosocomial transmission. 
However, given ongoing human-to-human transmission in 
Riyadh, it cannot be ruled out that some HCWs acquired 
infection from outside KFMC. Molecular epidemiology 
indicates 1 definite cluster of transmission associated with 
KFMC-1–like viruses, which are genetically closely relat-
ed (KFMC-1–6). There are plausible epidemiologic links 
for transmission from patient EA-1, the first known patient 
admitted to KFMC in 2014, in the ER to patient KFMC-0, 
then to patient KFMC-1, and to patients KFMC-2–KFMC-
6. Because no virus sequence data was available patients 
EA-1 or KFMC-0, the role of these 2 persons in the trans-
mission chain remains presumptive. The nearly identical 
virus genetic sequences for KFMC-1, -2, -3, -4, -5, and -6 
and plausible epidemiologic exposures provide more defi-
nite pathways of transmission (online Technical Appendix 
1 Figure 2). Although virus KFMC-2 has 1 unique nucleo-
tide substitution (T5321C), that sequence derives from a 
specimen collected late in the patient’s illness and might 
have originated in her after she transmitted infection to pa-
tients KFMC-4 and KFMC-6.
Genetic identity of virus KFMC-3 with viruses in the 
KFMC-1 cluster led to reassessment of the assumption 
that infection of patient KFMC-3 was externally acquired 
Figure 3.	Nucleotide	differences	
from	consensus	ancestral	
sequences	of	Middle	East	
respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus	
(MERS-CoV),	Saudi	Arabia,	
2014,	estimated	at	nodes	C	and	
E	in	a	time-resolved	phylogenetic	
tree	(Figure	2).	The	region	of	the	
genome	sequenced	is	indicated	
by	the	length	of	each	box.	Exact	
genome	polymorphic	nucleotide	
positions,	sampling	date,	and	
nucleotide	substitutions	is	shown	
in	online	Technical	Appendix	
2	(http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/21/11/15-0944-Techapp2.
xlsx).	Nucleotide	changes	are	
indicated	by	red	(A),	orange	(T),	
blue	(C),	and	green	(G)	vertical	
bars.	ORF,	open	reading	frame;	
KKUH,	King	Khalid	University	
Hospital;	KFMC,	King	Fahad	
Medical	City;	KSA,	Kingdom	of	
Saudi	Arabia.
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infection. Retesting of 2 archived (April 2014) specimens, 
1 of which was positive for influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 vi-
rus, showed that patient KFMC-3 was nosocomially infect-
ed with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus and MERS-CoV 
before her discharge on May 4, and this MERS-CoV was 
closely related to the KFMC-1 virus group. The source of 
infection for patient KFMC-3 was unclear. This patient 
used the intensive care unit bed used by patient EA-1 on 
April 15, and patient KFMC-8 occupied the isolation room 
vacated by patient EA-2, which raised the possibility of 
fomite transmission or transmission associated with HCW 
cases not detected by the surveillance system.
Although epidemiologic linkages would have led us 
to deduce that patient KFMC-9 may have acquired infec-
tion from the KFMC-1 virus cluster, viral genetic analysis 
conclusively demonstrates that this was a separate intro-
duction into KFMC through a person with an externally 
acquired infection with a virus closely related to viruses 
at KKUH. Molecular epidemiology also demonstrated that 
virus KFMC-7, KFMC-8, and KFMC-10 were not linked 
to viruses in the KFMC-1 cluster, although there were 
plausible epidemiologic links with patients infected with 
viruses from the KFMC-1 cluster. These 3 infections might 
have resulted from 1, 2, or 3 independent virus introduc-
tions from outside KFMC.
Our data suggest that the ER and MW-C at KFMC 
were major foci of transmission. Although findings are 
not conclusive, HCWs with mild upper respiratory illness 
who continued to work might have contributed to trans-
mission. Many of these issues were addressed during and 
after this outbreak, including, but not limited to, enhancing 
awareness of MERS through electronic communication, 
establishing in-house capacity for rapid MERS-CoV test-
ing, active screening of KFMC staff who had influenza-
like symptoms through a dedicated influenza clinic, es-
tablishing a triage area for patients in the ED, designation 
of wards for isolation and screening of suspected MERS 
cases, and strengthening infection control practices among 
staff by mandatory training.
Our study had limitations. Archived respiratory speci-
mens from patients with MERS acquired outside KFMC 
(EA-1–EA-9) were unavailable for genomic analysis, 
which caused us to make assumptions in our putative 
chains of transmission. Some of the retrospectively re-
trieved epidemiologic data were obtained through inter-
views with HCWs and patients 1 year after the outbreak. 
For example, data on PPE use and extent of exposure to 
individual MERS-infected patients was difficult to estab-
lish with confidence. Thus, risk factors or modes of trans-
mission (i.e., roles of large or small droplets, contact) could 
not be established. Dates and ward locations of patients and 
staff were available from the electronic medical record sys-
tems at KFMC, and we relied on proximity analysis (e.g., 
patients being co-housed in the same ward or nursed by the 
same nursing team members as other known patients with 
MERS) to provide epidemiologic context to the molecular 
epidemiologic data.
In summary, we provide molecular epidemiologic 
data derived from complete virus genome genetic analy-
sis that is suggestive of a large MERS outbreak involving 
multiple health care facilities in Riyadh, suggesting on-
going human-to-human transmission over many months. 
Using molecular analysis supplemented by available epi-
demiologic data, we identified MERS-CoV transmission 
within a large health care facility and demonstrated the 
feasibility and value of complete viral genome sequence 
analysis in outbreak investigations. We showed that what 
was seemingly a contiguous outbreak within KFMC was 
caused by multiple introductions of virus from outside the 
hospital. The small number of mutations observed across 
the 29,897-nt genome analyzed during this outbreak em-
phasizes the need for complete genome analysis if molecu-
lar epidemiology is to be meaningful in such settings. The 
ongoing outbreak of MERS in South Korea (2), the largest 
cluster of transmission from a returning traveler to date, 
highlights the ongoing threat from MERS and the need for 
understanding pathways of transmission. Detailed molecu-
lar epidemiology can contribute to these efforts and thus 
help minimize transmission.
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